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The year 2016 offered two additional opportunities to the ECJ to pronounce itself on 
the crucial and tricky tension between the preservation of the criminal policy’s 
effectiveness on the one hand and the concrete protection of Human Rights on the 
other. In its first judgment Aranyosi and Căldăraru2, rendered in April and already 
widely discussed3, the Court had to rule on the protection of the principle of human 
dignity and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments in the field of EU 
criminal cooperation. The question submitted to the ECJ was whether solid evidence, 
showing that the detention conditions in a Member State issuing a European arrest 
warrant (hereafter: EAW) were incompatible with fundamental rights, could allow or 
oblige the executing judicial authority of a requested Member State to refuse the 
execution of that arrest warrant. A few months later, a similar question was raised but 
this time in the field of International cooperation. More specifically the ECJ was asked 
under which conditions in terms of protection of fundamental rights Mr. Petruhhin, an 
Estonian citizen who had made use of his right to move freely within the EU, could be 
surrendered upon an extradition request by Latvia to a third country, Russia4. 
 
These two cases, pointing out the same dilemma (preventing the risk of impunity 
versus guaranteeing the protection of human rights) in distinct spheres (European 
versus International criminal cooperation), shed some light on the main feature 
differencing both domains; i.e.) the assumption of (in)existence of a high level of 
mutual trust between the actors involved.  
 
Indeed, on the one hand, the Aranyosi and Căldăraru case concerns criminal 
cooperation in the EU, namely between Germany and Hungary (Aranyosi) and 
Germany and Romania (Căldăraru). More precisely, it is related to the EAW 
mechanism, which is founded on the high level of confidence between Member 
States and allows for the establishment of a simplified and accelerated system for the 
surrender of convicted or suspected persons5. As Member States (’authorities) 
(must) trust each other, the refusal of execution of a EAW may or must only take 
place in a few specific situations exhaustively foreseen by the Framework-Decision 
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on the EAW6. In all other cases, national authorities have to automatically pursue the 
transfer of the person concerned by the arrest warrant. 
 
On the other hand, the Petruhhin scenario is related to the implementation of an 
international convention on extradition between a Member State and a third country, 
whereby the former is asked by the latter to transfer a EU citizen for the purposes of 
criminal proceedings. Like any other instrument of international collaboration, an 
extradition agreement relies upon a certain degree of trust7, loyalty and cooperation8. 
This degree of trust, however, cannot be compared to the level of confidence which 
is supposed to exist between Member States of the EU. The difference is attested, 
for instance by the fact that the bilateral extradition treaty at issue contained the 
principle of non-extradition of contracting parties’ nationals9. This principle, included 
in the majority of such treaties10 and rooted in the sovereignty of states vis-à-vis their 
nationals, precisely constitutes an expression of the lack of confidence towards other 
states’ legal systems to satisfactorily and impartially try foreigners11. It is, therefore, in 
principle rejected by EU “trust-based” criminal cooperation instruments12.  
 
Hence, while a certain degree of trust does underlie both the EAW system and the 
international treaties on extradition in so far as they enable cooperation, the intensity 
of trust fundamentally differs, setting distinctive limits to mutual assistance and 
hierarchizing both mechanisms. Indeed, the different degree of trust between, on the 
one hand, Member States and between, on the other, Member States and third 
countries, is key to understanding the distinct approach adopted by the Court in 
cases concerning purely EU cooperation versus international cooperation.  
 
I. Verification of the Risk Encountered by the Individual Subject to a EAW or an 
Extradition Request in the Process of Transfer to the Requesting State 
 
In both cases, the Court had to rule on the behavior that had to be adopted by 
national judges before transferring a convicted or suspected EU citizen to another 
State for the purpose of criminal proceedings in the presence of a risk of inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment of individuals detained in that State.  
 
Regarding EU internal criminal cooperation, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ 
considered, in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru case, after having analysed the wording 
and the objective of the EAW Framework Decision13, that the national judge must do 
a two-step analysis before refusing the execution of a EAW with the aim of protecting 
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fundamental rights. The national judge must first assess whether there are 
“deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain 
groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention” in the requesting 
Member State14, notably on the basis of information provided by judgments of 
international courts such as the ECtHR or decisions, reports, or other documents 
produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the UN (§89). 
Nonetheless, as underlined by the Court, “a finding that there is a real risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of general conditions of detention in the 
issuing Member State cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to execute a European 
arrest warrant” (§90). Indeed, after the identification of such a risk, the national judge 
has to, moreover, “make a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there 
are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to 
that risk because of the conditions for his detention envisaged in the issuing Member 
State” (§92). This individualized analysis must be carried out by means of a request 
to the issuing authority for “all necessary supplementary information on the 
conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained in 
that Member State” on the basis of Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision (§95).  A 
high threshold for rebutting the trust in other Member States’ capability to ensure the 
protection of fundamental rights, by refusing the execution of a EAW, was thus set by 
the ECJ.  As a matter of fact, it is only if both conditions are fulfilled that the executing 
authority will have to postpone the execution of the EAW. 
 
In the Petruhhin case, the ECJ first found the EU protection of fundamental rights to 
be applicable, as the Estonian person subject to the request of extradition had used 
its freedom of movement by moving to Latvia. More specifically, the Court relied its 
analysis upon art. 19 of the Charter of fundamental rights15, according to which “no 
one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk 
that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”, in conjunction with art. 1 and 416. The Court 
however did not impose the same duty upon national judges pursuing an extradition 
request from a third country. Indeed, even if the ECJ, relying on the Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru ruling, also required from national authorities to examine whether “a real 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals in the requesting third State” 
(§58) existed, it did not require from the national authority to, additionally, make the 
specific and precise assessment of the risks faced in concreto by the individual 
concerned in case of surrender. In the Petruhhin scenario, the national judge thus 
seems prevented from transferring a EU citizen once the competent authority of the 
requested Member State has established the existence of a real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment of individuals in the requesting third State (§58) without however 
having assessed the specific risk encountered by the convicted or suspected person.  
 
The distinctive level of trust governing both sorts of cooperation can undoubtedly 
explain the different approach of the ECJ. Indeed, the EU principle of mutual trust 
between Member States, on which the EAW is based, “requires, particularly with 
regards to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in 
exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying 
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PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, §89. 
15 According to the AG BOT, this provision is not applicable in connection with the EAW system  (in EU 
internal cooperation), but only in the framework of international criminal cooperation, see Opinion of AG 
BOT in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, 3 March 2016, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:140, § 46. The Court moreover did not relied upon art. 19 in its judgement on that 
case, but on art. 1 and 4 of the Charter.  
16 Art. 1 provides the right to human dignity and art. 4 prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
  
with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by it”17. Member 
States are thus required, when implementing the EAW, “to presume that fundamental 
rights have been observed by the other Member States”18 and the threshold allowing 
the refusal of a EAW, expressing distrust in another Member State, is thus high. 
Moreover, mechanisms provided by the Framework-Decision, supporting confidence 
between Member States, such as the direct exchange of information, have to be 
mobilized before making exception to EU criminal cooperation.   
 
Conversely, International criminal assistance, which is not supported by such 
cooperative tools, nor by a framework for addressing threats to human rights as 
provided by EU law19, does not seem to be underlined by a sufficiently high degree of 
trust justifying a presumption of the respect of fundamental rights by other countries.  
The “simple” evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals 
in the requesting third State thus prevents the surrender of a EU citizen to that state, 
even in the absence of an indication that the person concerned will concretely be 
subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a transfer to the third state.  
 
II. Precedence taken by European Trust-Based Mechanisms on International 
Cooperation 
 
On top of justifying a distinct examination of the risks encountered in terms of 
fundamental rights depending on whether EU or international cooperation is 
concerned, the principle of mutual trust also entails the recognition of supremacy of 
one system vis-à-vis the other. Indeed, the Court was also asked in the Petruhhin 
case whether the fact that Mr. Petruhhin, an Estonian national, could not benefit from 
the same protection against extradition from Latvia to that of Latvian nationals, 
constituted a discrimination on the ground of nationality, prohibited by art. 18 of the 
TEU. The Court first recalled, on the basis of its previous case law20, that although 
the rules on extradition fall within the competence of Member states in the absence 
of an international agreement binding the EU, they had to respect EU law and, 
notably, the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality applicable to 
situations falling within the scope of application of the Treaties such as situations 
where EU citizens have exercised their freedom to move in the European territory 
(§30). It noted that the unequal treatment allowing the extradition of a Union citizen 
who is the national of another Member State constituted a restriction to the right of 
freedom of movement, within the meaning of art. 21 TFEU21. By means of this 
observation, the Court acknowledged the fact that a person transferred to a third-
country, pursuing an international extradition agreement, could possibly be 
disadvantaged compared to individuals surrendered, on the basis of a EAW, to a 
“trustful” Member State. This restriction was however, in the Court’s view, motivated 
by the legitimate objective of preventing the risk of impunity for persons who have 
committed an offence, since the requested Member State has in general no 
jurisdiction to try cases when neither the perpetrator nor the victim of the alleged 
offence is one of its national. Nevertheless, the ECJ found that the application of EU 
rules on criminal cooperation and notably the mechanism of EAW with the view to 
surrender the person to the member state of which he or she is a national for the 
purposes of prosecution was a less intrusive measure in the right of free movement. 
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20 CJUE, Rottmann, 2 March 2010, C-135/08, ECLI :EU:C:2010:104, §41. 
21 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Petruhhin, 6 September 2016, Case C-182/5, ECLI:EU:C:2016:630, §33. 
  
As a matter of fact, the EAW system equally enables the achievement of the goal of 
preventing the risk of impunity when the Member State of the suspected or convicted 
person has jurisdiction, pursuant to its national law, to prosecute that person for 
offences committed outside its national territory. Therefore, the Court considered that 
Member States must, before transferring a EU citizen to a third country, first mobilize 
EU criminal cooperation and try to surrender the person to the Member State of 
which he or she is a national for the purposes of  its prosecution. It is only if EU 
criminal cooperation cannot satisfactorily prevent impunity that a national judge 
could, after having assessed the possible risks in terms of fundamental rights 
protection, surrender a EU citizen to a third-country.  In the name of the rights of free 
movement, the judgment in the Petruhhin case thus entails precedence of EU 
criminal cooperation over International criminal assistance22, as far as both could 
enable the prosecution of the alleged offender, encompassing therefore a 
“Europeanisation” of the principle “aut dedere, aut judicare”. The Member State 
receiving a request for extradition from a third State concerning a non national EU 
citizen must therefore first inform the Member State of which the citizen is a national 
so that it can, if it has jurisdiction pursuant its national law to prosecute that person, 
issue a EAW in order to obtain the surrendering of that person. This new judicial 
obligation, based on the principle of non-discrimination, seems yet in contradiction 
with art. 16 (3) of the Framework Decision which states that, “in the event of a conflict 
between a European arrest warrant and a request for extradition presented by a third 
country, the decision on whether the European arrest warrant or the extradition 
request takes precedence shall be taken by the competent authority of the executing 
Member State with due consideration of all the circumstances, in particular those 
referred to in paragraph 1 and those mentioned in the applicable convention”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The joint reading of the judgments rendered by the ECJ in cases Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru in April and in Petruhhin in September 2016, both related to criminal 
mutual assistance, illustrate the major role played by the principle of mutual trust in 
EU criminal cooperation. Indeed, by having to answer a similar question in the field of 
a purely EU situation on the one hand and, a question in connection with the 
relationship between a Member State and a third country on the other, the Court of 
Justice took the opportunity to implicitly highlight the feature differencing both 
domains and, also, to specify their interaction. The questions referred to the Court 
concerned, among others, the reconciliation of the prevention of impunity by 
transferring EU citizens convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law to 
another country and the protection of their fundamental rights when evidence exist 
that persons detained in the requesting state face a risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Because of the mutual trust Member States should have in each other as 
regards the protection of fundamental rights, it is only after a specific and precise 
assessment of the risks faced by the individual in case of surrender that a national 
authority may postpone the execution of a EAW to a Member State whose places of 
detention are considered as being deficient in terms of fundamental freedoms. 
Conversely, in the framework of International criminal cooperation, the transferal of a 
EU citizen to a third country must, in the view of the Court, be abandoned once there 
exist evidence of practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are 
manifestly contrary to the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the requesting third country. Moreover, the transfer may only take place in case EU 
criminal cooperation could not, in itself, prevent impunity.  
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The principle of mutual trust, founded on the premise “that each Member State 
shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set 
of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU”23, thus 
seems to justify a more severe ground of refusal of cooperation within the EU than in 
the field of collaboration with third countries and, also, the fact that precedence 
should be granted to the former over the latter, when both can equally assure 
the prosecution of criminal offences.  
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